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I. INTRODUCTION
For all the suggestiveness and staying power of his market-in-ideas
metaphor, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s most significant influence on
First Amendment law has turned out to be his notion that only imminent
harm can justify punishment for expressions of opinion. This emphasis
on the time dimension in the calculus of harm is now entrenched in
modern doctrine.1 It is easy to imagine how First Amendment law might
have developed differently had Holmes’s peculiar focus on imminence
not been a factor in shaping how the freedom of speech has come to be
understood in the United States.2
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States3 in November of 1919
resolved some important ambiguities regarding his understanding of
the role of time in identifying the harm-causing potential that can justify
regulating political advocacy. He had introduced his clear-and-presentdanger test eight months earlier in Schenck v. United States,4 applying it
to uphold criminal convictions of two speakers for distributing
pamphlets harshly criticizing the current war and the conscription of
soldiers to fight it. The same day, Holmes curiously failed to mention
the test while upholding another conviction for war criticism, this time
contained in a German-language newspaper.5 A week later, he wrote the
majority opinion upholding the conviction of Eugene Debs, the most

1 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See also Thomas Healy,
Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009).
2 Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Robert Jackson, and Judge Learned Hand all
embraced interpretations of the freedom of speech that do not limit the power to punish
advocacy to situations in which the predicted harm is imminent. See Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Id. at 561 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, D.J.). See also
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, C.J.). On how advocacy can
be punished on the basis of non-imminent harms under the Canadian Constitution, see
RONALD KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 51–52
(New York Univ. Press 2006). On how non-imminent harms figure in decisions of the
International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreting
pertinent international conventions, see Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to
Insult in International Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 35–37 (2017).
3 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919).
4 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
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famous Socialist in the land, for giving a public speech praising draft
resisters.6 That opinion also failed to say anything about clear and
present danger. Combined, the three decisions left confusion in their
wake regarding what test applied in political advocacy cases.
Moreover, parsing the one opinion in which Holmes did apply the
clear-and-present-danger test, Schenck, leaves the reader with several
questions regarding the meaning of its terms. For example, under the
test as he formulated it, what needs to be “present” as well as “clear” is
the danger rather than the realization of harm. Moreover, “present” can
mean “being in view or at hand” (thus, doubling down on “clear”) as well
as “now existing or in progress.”7 So exactly what role did Holmes
ascribe to the passage of time in demarcating the dangers that can justify
the regulation of “expressions of opinion and exhortations?”8
In Schenck, Holmes defended his assumption that harm can justify
regulating speech by offering examples of utterances he took to be selfevidently within the government’s authority to punish. His most famous
example, of course, was “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.”9 That illustration certainly is about the instant effect that an
utterance can have. But Holmes included two other examples in
Schenck: “uttering words that may have all the effect of force”10 and “if
an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved.”11 Words
“that may have all the effect of force” might, but need not, result in
instantaneous consequences, as when a person in authority gives an
order for subordinates to act at a specified time in the future. And an
“actual obstruction” by means of speech convincing someone to refuse
to be conscripted could occur either immediately or eventually.
Holmes’s example seemed to encompass both scenarios. Moreover, in
Frohwerk v. United States, one of the cases in which Holmes upheld a
conviction while never mentioning clear and present danger, he cited
“the counselling of a murder”12 as an example of speech that can be
punished consistently with the First Amendment. Counseling a murder
might occasionally be a call for immediate action, but more often it will
be advice to do the evil deed after some planning and waiting on
opportunity. Holmes’s use of these examples to show that much speech

6

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 921 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds.,
10th ed. 1994).
8 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 631.
9 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
7

BLASI (DO NOT DELETE)

178

10/13/2020 10:36 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:175

can be regulated hardly implies that speech can be regulated only when
it threatens to cause harm in a very short time period.
But in his Abrams dissent, Holmes left little doubt about the role of
time in his danger test: “[T]he United States constitutionally may punish
speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that
the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”13 Here, he
clears up the ambiguity regarding “present” by substituting “imminent”
and “forthwith,” surely references to time. Later in the opinion he says
that what is needed to justify regulation is “the present danger of
immediate evil.”14
Why did Holmes choose, at least as of his Abrams dissent, to
disallow all justifications for regulating speech that rest upon harms
resulting from delayed or cumulative effects? Some such harms can be
consequential. Audience members moved by a speaker’s call to mischief
might take a while to summon up the will or means to act, but once they
do, great damage can result. There are facilitative and enabling harms
that play out over time, for example, harms that take the form of
recruiting and training persons for future harmful actions. There can be
slow-developing but ultimately destructive harms to the discursive and
inquisitive atmosphere. By insidious means, speech can cause harm to
political goods such as trust, accountability, tolerance, mutual respect,
recognition of legitimate authority, acceptance of defeat, fulfillment of
duties, and willingness to sacrifice. Speech can undermine the civic
standing of individuals and groups. Surely Holmes did not believe that
only imminent harms can do much damage. So how might he have
defended his emphasis on the time factor of the harm calculus had he
taken the trouble to develop his reasons in more detail?
II. EIGHT ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING IMMINENCE
I can think of eight arguments for treating imminent harms
differently from more remote harms so far as justifying the regulation
of speech is concerned. Some arguments, it should be said at the outset,
fit better than others with Holmes’s broader patterns of thought.
A. Argument One: Remote harms from dangerous advocacy can be
prevented or contained by refutation.
Holmes’s assertion in his Abrams dissent that “the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
13
14

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 628.
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the market”15 could be read to imply the strategic judgment that, absent
immediacy of impact, the harm that speech can cause is best contained
by refutation. Were that his claim, he would be in good company. In
Areopagitica, the foundational essay of the free speech literature, John
Milton says of falsehood, “Her confuting is the best and surest
suppressing.”16 In his renowned concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, Justice Brandeis proclaims, “the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.”17 Holmes joined that opinion, in which Brandeis
eloquently underscored his call to “regulate” dangerous advocacy
through informed criticism rather than punishment: “If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence.”18
Were we to interpret Holmes’s joining of Brandeis’ Whitney
concurrence as signaling his full agreement with the details of the
argument, it would be hard to escape the conclusion that he had
considerable faith in the power of refutation. And Holmes does say in
the stirring final paragraph of the Abrams dissent that ordinarily we
should “leave the correction of evil counsels to time,”19 perhaps
implying that what time permits is the opportunity to demonstrate the
“falsehood and fallacies” of the speech at issue.
I think that is reading too much into Holmes’s signing on to the
Whitney concurrence and invoking “time” as the preferred remedy in
Abrams. In his day, joining a colleague’s opinion proved much less about
agreement on specifics than it does in the current age of promiscuous
separate opinions. Most telling, in many of his other writings, Holmes
commented on the notable persistence of bad ideas in the face of
demonstrably telling refutation. Consider this lament he wrote to
Frederick Pollock: “Malthus pleased me immensely—and left me sad. A
hundred years ago he busted fallacies that politicians and labor leaders
still live on. One thinks that an error exposed is dead, but exposure
amounts to nothing when people want to believe.”20

15

Id. at 630.
John Milton, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 746 (Merritt Y.
Hughes ed., 1957).
17 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 377.
19 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31.
20 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1914), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 219 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942). For a more colorful
reiteration of this observation, see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski
(Dec. 26, 1917), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 122 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (“When
16
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Holmes was deeply interested in the workings of time as a force in
human affairs, including as a force shaping the development of societal
institutions and understanding. A year before writing the Abrams
dissent, he observed in a law review article that “property, friendship,
and truth have a common root in time.”21 In the famous concluding
paragraph of the dissent, where Holmes introduces his market “test of
truth,” the empirical grounding for his argument is that “time has upset
many fighting faiths.”22 But so far as I can find, he never listed among
the benefits of “time” that it facilitates the making of counter-arguments.
Regarding Holmes’s intellectual kinship with Brandeis, who lived
for detailed, fact-based argumentation, the genuine bond between the
two legal titans had something of the quality of opposites attracting.
Two months after Holmes wrote his opinions in Schenck and Debs, he
reported to Pollock that:
Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with
reference to my summer occupations. He said you talk about
improving your mind, you only exercise it on the subjects with
which you are familiar. Why don’t you try something new . . . .
Take up the textile industries in Massachusetts and after
reading the reports sufficiently you can go to Lawrence and
get a human notion of how it really is.23
Conceding to Pollock that Brandeis had a pedagogic point, Holmes
admitted that he could never complete the assignment: “I hate facts. . . .
I have little doubt that it would be good for my immortal soul to plunge
into them, good also for the performance of my duties, but I shrink from
the bore . . . .”24
This is not to suggest that Holmes and Brandeis had nothing in
common that bears on how they thought about the freedom of speech.
On some fundamental matters, they held similar views. Both believed
that freedom of speech is primarily for the benefit of audiences and the
society beyond (and in the future) rather than the speakers themselves,
although Holmes was more single-minded than Brandeis in thinking so.
Both cared about the state of public opinion and thought that the
freedom of speech can serve the project of producing and maintaining a

I read Malthus, I thought he had ripped the guts out of some humbugs—but they are as
alive as ever today. Humbugs have no guts—and live all the better without them.”).
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918).
22 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
23 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 26, 1919), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 13–14 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942).
24 Id.
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public opinion that enables the “wishes” of the populace to be “safely . . .
carried out.”25
Holmes’s concern for audience and societal well-being meant that
he had to consider the harm that speech can cause over time. He did not
share Brandeis’ faith that possible future harm from speech can be
neutralized or contained by refutation, but he did think that his cure-all
“time” provides other weapons for limiting harms that do not
materialize immediately.
B. Argument Two: Remote harms from dangerous advocacy will be
limited by the predictable dissipation over time of energy and
will.
Holmes received considerable criticism about his Debs opinion
from prominent liberals who previously had lionized him for his
dissents in Lochner v. New York26 and Hammer v. Dagenhart.27 That
criticism prompted him to write to Herbert Croly, editor of the New
Republic, defending himself. Holmes said in the letter:
I hated to have to write the Debs case and still more those of
the other poor devils before us the same day and the week
before. I could not see the wisdom of pressing the cases . . . but
I cannot doubt that there was evidence warranting a
conviction on the disputed issues of fact. . . . When people are
putting out all their energies in battle I don’t think it
unreasonable to say we won’t have obstacles intentionally put
in the way of raising troops—by persuasion any more than by
force. But in the main I am for aeration of all effervescing
convictions—there is no way so quick for letting them get
flat.28
The justification Holmes gives in the letter for “aeration of all
effervescing convictions” may be glib, but the argument that ideas can
“get flat” if given time should be taken seriously. The notion that ideas
tend to lose their potency over time might justify disallowing
consideration of remote harms when determining whether political
advocacy can be punished.

25

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that states have the power to prescribe maximum hours for bakers).
27 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277–81 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress has the power to prohibit child labor in industries which market
their goods in interstate commerce).
28 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 20, at 203 (letter of May 13, 1919). He never
sent the letter to Croly because he told his trusted correspondent Harold Laski, “some
themes may become burning.” But Holmes couldn’t resist sharing the letter with Laski.
26
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Holmes conceived the “competition of the market” in ideas to be
largely about contending forces holding irreconcilable, incorrigible
beliefs—”Can’t Helps,” he called them29—trying to muster the energy,
strength of will, savvy, persistence, and numbers to prevail. In this view,
persuasion, enlightenment, empirical proof, and the spirit of inquiry
play minor supporting roles at best.30 In 1900, writing an introduction
to a new edition of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, Holmes opined
that “the proximate test of a good government is that the dominant
power has its way.”31 In a speech to the Harvard Law School Association
of New York in 1913, he asserted that “the function of private ownership
is to divine in advance the equilibrium of social desires . . . .”32 In an
article published in the Harvard Law Review in 1918, the year before he
confronted the First Amendment claims in Schenck, Debs, and Abrams,
Holmes wrote:
I used to say, when I was young, that truth was the majority
vote of that nation that could lick all others . . . . and I think that
the statement was correct in so far as it implied that our test
of truth is a reference to either a present or an imagined future
majority in favor of our view.33
Seven years later, at age eighty-four, the conflating of truth and power
remained his theme. In his dissent in Gitlow v. New York, Holmes said,
“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the
only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.”34
Someone who believes that the significance of public speech lies
more in how it engenders motivation and mobilization than in how it
facilitates persuasion or enlightenment might well think that the best
force against dangerous messages is time. Would-be inciters of
potentially harmful actions and commitments often have difficulty
sustaining enthusiasm after the initial iconoclastic excitement wears off.
Political energy, whether reformist, revolutionary, or revanchist, is a
finite resource and one that usually wanes over time. When in his
29

Holmes, supra note 21, at 40.
See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
38–44.
31 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MONTESQUIEU (1900), reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
250, 258 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. ed., 1921).
32 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the
Harvard Law School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), reprinted in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 294.
33 Holmes, supra note 21, at 40.
34 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30

BLASI (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

10/13/2020 10:36 PM

WHY EXACTLY DID HE REQUIRE IMMINENCE?

183

Abrams dissent Holmes enjoins us to “leave the correction of evil
counsels to time” whenever the dangers they pose are not imminent, he
may have been banking on energy diminution.
If so, he was painting with too broad a brush. A full consideration
of the matter requires attention to the role that leadership and
organization can play in sustaining the energy to use speech to do harm.
Isolated demagogues may be defanged by time, but time can be a friend
to patient, systematic organizers of harm creation. To address that
problem, Holmes would need another argument.
C. Argument Three: Remote harms can still be addressed under
Holmes’s imminence requirement because his test applies only
to one type of regulation of one type of speech: criminal or
severe civil punishment for expressions of opinion that do not
encroach upon private rights.
A common mistake in analyzing a legal standard, whether adopted
or proposed, is to focus too much on the standard’s prescriptions and
not enough on its range of coverage. In trying to understand Holmes’s
reasons for disallowing the consideration of remote harms in cases like
Abrams, we need to have a sense of what kinds of disputes about speech
he thought should be governed by his clear-and-present-danger test. In
fact, Holmes said some things in his Abrams dissent which suggest that
he did not envision his test having extensive coverage.
The closing sentence of the dissenting opinion begins: “Of course, I
am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were
all that were uttered here . . . .”35 Earlier in the opinion, he states his
proposed standard: “It is only the present danger of immediate evil or
an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.”36 And
again in the famous final paragraph:
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country.37
Apparently he did not think his demanding clear-and-present-danger
test should apply to regulations of speech that do not target expressions
of opinion. Moreover, if we take him literally, even the regulation of

35
36
37

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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opinion might fall outside the ken of his test when it is designed to
protect private rights.
If it is helpful for interpreting Holmes—and it may not be—to look
to opinions he wrote while serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, his differentiating and categorizing various kinds of
speech disputes in Abrams should come as no surprise. In defamation
actions, he ruled that the privilege that protects factual errors made in
good faith in a private letter of recommendation does not apply to errors
made by a newspaper accusing a private party of fraudulent dealings
with public officials.38 He refused to enjoin labor picketing that harms a
business by persuading customers, suppliers, or scabs not to deal with
it, but permitted injunctions against picketing that urges breach of an
existing contract, threatens violence, or blocks physical passage.39
Because he placed speech disputes involving access to government
property or employment in a separate category, he had no trouble
concluding that a municipality can prohibit its police officers from
soliciting political contributions40 and disallow public speaking on its
commons. 41
Holmes’s lifelong practice of refusing to treat all cases involving
speech as raising similar issues also explains the examples he adduced
in Schenck and Frohwerk of speech he considered punishable even when
the harm it causes is delayed. None of his examples of such speech
involve “the expression of opinions where private rights are not
concerned.”42 Like personal defamation, counseling murder threatens
the private right of the specifically targeted victim. Giving an order to a
subordinate or devoted follower that “has all the effect of force”43 is
more than an exhortation or expression of an opinion. In Frohwerk,
Holmes observed that the First Amendment “cannot have been, and
obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language.”44 Clearly he conceived of his clear-and-present-danger test
as applicable to only a subset of speech disputes.

38

See Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1, 6 (Mass. 1891).
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
40 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
41 Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895).
42 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628.
43 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
44 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). I am indebted to Frederick
Schauer for calling my attention to this important dictum. See Frederick Schauer, Every
Possible Use of Language?, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 33–47 (L. Bollinger & G. Stone eds.,
2019).
39
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Dicta and examples such as these might tempt us to think that
Holmes understood criminal prosecutions for speech of the sort at issue
in Schenck and Abrams to be the exclusive province of the clear-andpresent-danger test, leaving the consideration of remote harms to be
permissible in other kinds of prosecutions, civil actions for damages,
and disputes over access to government resources, including public
employment. It should be noted, however, that in a case that did not
involve criminal prosecution, decided the year before his embrace of the
imminence requirement in Abrams, Holmes took his brethren to task for
ruling that the federal contempt-of-court statute applies not just to
outbursts in the presence of the judge but also published accusations of
judicial incompetence or lack of integrity.45 His dissent, although an
exercise in statutory interpretation, reads like a dress rehearsal for
Abrams in its emphasis on the importance of the immediacy factor.46
Moreover, it was a case involving naturalization rather than
criminal prosecution that provoked Holmes to what may be his most
eloquent protest against letting remote harms justify the regulation of
speech. In United States v. Schwimmer, decided in 1929, the Court ruled
that naturalized citizenship can be denied on the basis of the applicant’s
pacifist beliefs.47 The concern that justified the denial of citizenship,
said Justice Butler for the majority, was the possibility that in some
future war Ms. Schwimmer might express her pacifism publicly, to the
detriment of military mobilization.48 This preposterous remote harm
rationale provoked the eighty-eight-year-old Holmes to take up his
potent pen one last time in defense of the freedom of speech. He noted
the pacifist beliefs of the Quakers and suggested that few Americans
wished for their expulsion from the country “because they believe more
than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.”49
The appreciation that Holmes was sensitive to the coverage
question and did not treat all regulations or categories of speech as
warranting identical legal treatment goes some distance to answer the
criticism that, for many purposes, any sensible legal regime has to be
45 See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 422–23 (1918) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
46 See also United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 436–37 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting), in which Holmes read the First
Amendment to protect speakers from being denied second-class postal privileges on the
basis of their prior alleged violations of the Espionage Act. In that case, Holmes did not
invoke the clear-and-present-danger test, but he did hold a non-criminal regulation of
speech to a high bar of justification. See id.
47 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
48 Id. at 651–53.
49 Id. at 655 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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able to consider remote harms caused by speech. But we really cannot
judge whether Holmes’s imminence requirement can be defended based
on its limited coverage without greater elaboration than he provided
regarding the scope of application he envisioned for his demanding
danger test.
D. Argument Four: Remote harms cannot count because only
imminent harms can be predicted and measured with any
degree of rigor, objectivity, and accuracy.
The passage of time introduces so many variables that any
estimation of the causal relationship between an expression of opinion
and remote harm must consist of guesswork untethered by evidence.
Consider what proof would be required to establish that the public
airing of a despicable opinion caused a subsequent (that is, “remote”)
harmful consequence such as a terrorist bombing, a sexual assault, or a
measurable increase in racially-motivated violence. We might predict
that such speech would lead eventually to such consequences, but that
judgment would be based on broad assumptions about general patterns
of influence rather than anything specific to the particular speech events
and the particular harms. Inevitably, the prediction of remote harm is a
speculative enterprise, rarely systematic or evidence based.
The speculation is compounded in the case of remote harms that
have a cumulative character. How is a court to decide which discrete
harms build on each other such that they are best considered together
as an entity? Must the process of accumulation have a synergistic
dimension, or can numerous independent events sometimes make up a
whole? How is a court to know when a critical mass of harm has been
achieved? And even if answers to these questions can be stipulated for
the purpose of doctrinal formulation and case resolution, how is the
phenomenon of accumulation to be proved in individual cases?
Holmes might have required imminence as a way of making
consequentialist analysis in the First Amendment realm satisfy
standards of objectivity worthy of legal and scientific positivism. As
Robert Gordon explains:
Positivism . . . is the belief that explanation must be scientific,
and that to be scientific it must confine its investigation to
observable phenomena—facts—and its method to induction
. . . . One can read whole sections of The Common Law as
Holmes’ attempt to turn law into something that permits the
exercise of this sort of positivist method.50
50 Robert W. Gordon, Holmes’ Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 719, 723 (1982). On Holmes’s attachment to inductive reasoning, see H. L.
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In his writing about the common law, Holmes went out of his way to
embrace standards of legal liability that are “external,” by which he
meant turning on observable phenomena subject to evidentiary proof.51
For example, in contract law he would have nothing to do with
subjective meeting of the minds; he thought that promissory obligations
derive from external manifestation.52
Still, whether Holmes should be considered a “positivist” is a
complicated question. Knowledgeable students of the Justice differ
regarding whether he was a legal positivist in the sense of someone like
H.L.A. Hart or Joseph Raz who derives legal authority exclusively from
objective phenomena.53 Of course, one does not need to be a legal
positivist to be a scientific positivist in the sense of someone who
withholds judgment about physical phenomena, including causal
relationships, in the absence of specific objective evidence. It is
scientific positivism (more precisely, social science or sociological
positivism) that raises questions about whether remote harms from
expressions of opinion can be accurately forecast.
There can be no doubt about Holmes’s attraction to the scientific
method. When asked whether reading Voltaire had influenced his
understanding of the nature of truth, he responded, “Oh no—it was not
Voltaire—it was the influence of the scientific way of looking at the
world . . . .”54 Holmes’s father, in addition to being a celebrated poet, was
a medical scientist who made a major discovery tracing a certain type of
bacterial infection during childbirth to inadequate sterilization.55

POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 127–32 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1984).
51 See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, 2 JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS
85–87, 164, 240 (Harvard Univ. Press 1963).
52 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464–65
(1897).
53 The literature on this subject is rich. See Gordon, supra note 50, at 722–27; Henry
M. Hart, Jr., Comment, Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1951);
Mark Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial
Court, 63 VA. L. REV. 975, 1044–45 (1977); Catherine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal
Method: The Predictive Theory of Law as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 SO. ILL. U. L.
J. 329 (1994); Robin West, Three Positivisms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 791 (1998). For a powerful
refutation of the legal positivist hypothesis, see Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The
Holmesian Judge in Theory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19 (1995). For brief
accounts of the legal positivism of Hart and Raz, see RAYMOND WACKS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 26–32, 37–39 (2006).
54 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in Felix
Cohen, The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 14 (1948).
55 G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 10
(Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
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The senior Holmes said that two things he had learned from
studying in Paris with a world-renowned pathologist were “not to take
authority when I have no facts” and “not to guess when I can know.”56
Justice Holmes once described himself as an even more consistent
adherent to the precepts of scientific positivism than was his father:
[T]here was with him, as with the rest of his generation, a
certain softness of attitude toward the interstitial miracle—
the phenomenon without phenomenal antecedents, that I did
not feel. . . . Probably a skeptical temperament that I got from
my mother had something to do with my way of thinking. . . .
But I think science was at the bottom.57
On that occasion, Holmes was writing to a philosopher of science, Morris
Cohen, so he could have been aiming to please. Nevertheless, it would
have been perfectly natural for him to have extended his characteristic
skepticism to the question of how rigorous it is possible to be in
predicting the remote harms that expressions of political opinion will
cause.
E. Argument Five: Allowing remote harms to be a basis for
regulating speech deprives putative speakers of knowable
standards for determining their possible legal jeopardy.
In common law actions for negligence, Holmes believed that, over
time, judges ought to be able to develop specific rules defining which
precautions need to be taken in recurring situations. He had no quarrel
with having jurors decide based on their experience what precautions a
person of ordinary prudence would take in particular circumstances,
but he believed that eventually the pattern of jury judgments in
recurring situations ought to be crystallized by judges into directive
rules to give actors more notice of their legal duties.58 This call for
directive judge-made common law rules never did take hold, perhaps
because most judges do not prioritize doctrinal transparency and
stability as much as Holmes did.
In a federal district court case decided two years before Holmes
embraced the imminence requirement in his Abrams dissent, Judge
Learned Hand adopted a test that might be considered the gold standard
for notifying potential speakers of what they can and cannot say if they

56 See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, 1 JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 17
(Harvard Univ. Press 1957).
57 Cohen, supra note 54, at 14–15.
58 See WHITE, supra note 55, at 162–63; see also Thomas C. Grey, Plotting the Path of
the Law, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 19, 40–41 (1997) (“Holmes placed a very high value on making
and keeping law predictable.”).
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want to avoid criminal liability. Hand interpreted the federal Espionage
Act of 1917,59 the statute that Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were later
convicted of violating, to permit all criticism of government policy and
actions, even “hostile criticism,” so long as the speaker does not “counsel
or advise others to violate the law as it stands.”60 Hand elaborated, “To
counsel or advise a man to an act is to urge upon him either that it is his
interest or his duty to do it.”61 The Second Circuit reversed Hand and
rejected his test,62 but he had occasion to urge his test on Holmes in
private correspondence, albeit unsuccessfully, shortly after the Schenck,
Debs, and Abrams cases were decided.63
Ever since Hand and Holmes failed to resolve their differences,
Holmes focusing on danger and Hand focusing on message, students of
the First Amendment have set up their respective tests as competing
approaches to the task of developing a relatively speaker-protective
First Amendment standard.64 The contrast can be illuminating, but
easily overlooked is how Hand might have influenced Holmes regarding
the importance of having a test that gives speakers notice of what they
can say with legal impunity.65 On that score, Hand’s test certainly is
better, but the way Holmes in Abrams unambiguously disallowed the
consideration of remote harms eliminated the greatest source of
uncertainty inherent in a test that turns on predicted danger. Both the
Hand and Holmes tests give speakers much better notice than would any
test that considered the remote harms caused by expressions of opinion.
One of the most trenchant criticisms of Holmes’s majority opinion
in the Debs case came from the distinguished University of Chicago law
professor Ernst Freund. In an article published in the New Republic in
May of 1919,66 Freund took issue with Holmes on several points,
59

Espionage Act, ch. 30, § 1, 40 Stat. 217–31 (repealed 1948).
See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, D.J.).
61 Id. Very likely thinking of Mark Anthony’s oration in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar,
he said that what matters is the “meaning conveyed” by the speech, not the literal
content. The forbidden counseling “may be accomplished as well by indirection as
expressly, since words carry the meaning that they impart.” Id.
62 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d. Cir. 1917).
63 See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 758–59 (1975).
64 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
134–35 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
65 For an argument that Hand’s Masses opinion might have influenced Holmes’s
Abrams dissent in a variety of subtle ways, including regarding how much juries can be
trusted in cases involving harsh criticism of government, see Thomas Healy, Anxiety and
Influence: Learned Hand and the Making of a Free Speech Dissent, 50 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 803
(2018).
66 See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 3,
1919, at 14 reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1973)
60
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including the question of whether Debs had had sufficient notice of what
speech was punishable. “To know what you may do and what you may
not do, and how far you may go in criticism,” wrote Freund, “is the first
condition of political liberty . . . .”67 Holmes read the article and was
dismissive of the analysis.68 Nevertheless, Freund had a point, and it
may well have registered with Holmes enough to have figured months
later into his decision in Abrams to exclude consideration of remote
harms.
F. Argument Six: Remote harms typically depend on so many
different contingencies converging that speakers who initiate
the causal sequence lack sufficient agency to be held
responsible for the harms.
A modern defender of the imminence requirement as a
precondition for punishing speech could well think that this argument
from attenuated agency has some purchase. One could even cite Holmes
in support of the proposition that contingency swallows up agency:
“Man is like a strawberry plant, the shoots that he throws out take root
and become independent centres.”69 But admitting that most speakers
and writers have scant control over what audiences do with their ideas
provides a reason to protect speech only if we assume that the
regulation of speech, or at least criminal punishment for speech, has to
track the agency of the speaker. Holmes did not believe that.
Regard for human agency did not play a large role in his legal or
political philosophy. About Kant’s postulate that human beings must be
treated as ends and not means, Holmes said:
I confess that I rebel at once. If we want conscripts, we march
them up to the front with bayonets in their rear to die for a
cause in which perhaps they do not believe. The enemy we
treat not even as a means but as an obstacle to be abolished, if
so it may be. I feel no pangs of conscience over either step
. . . .70
Instead of the blameworthiness of the individual offender, Holmes
believed that society’s desire for retribution, deterrence, and prevention
67

Id. at 240.
See Healy, supra note 65, at 818.
69 Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, supra note 54, at 23 (letter dated Sept. 6, 1920).
70 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1915). See also
HOWE, supra note 51, at 175–76; Gordon, supra note 50, at 724. (“Holmes also uses
positivist method to refute Kant’s theory that possession should be legally protected
because it is an extension of personality, an exercise of free will.”); David Luban, Justice
Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L. J. 449, 470 (1994) (“Holmes
was skeptical not only of Kant’s system of morality, but of morality as such.”).
68
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via incapacitation is what justifies criminal punishment.71 He
maintained, contrary to the view of almost all criminal law scholars both
then and now, that what constitutes a criminal attempt is not conduct
revealing sufficiently operationalized bad intentions but rather conduct
creating an objective risk of impending harmful conduct.72
One element of the danger test that Holmes put forth in the Abrams
dissent might seem to cast doubt on this claim that he was unconcerned
about speaker agency. His careful formulation of the test reads as
follows: “the United States constitutionally may punish speech that
produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it
will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United
States may constitutionally seek to prevent.”73 In the following
paragraph, he restates the test, again with speaker intent serving as an
independent basis for regulation: “It is only the present danger of
immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not
concerned.”74
What does it say about Holmes’s understanding of his test that he
thought either an actual danger of immediate harm or an intent on the
part of the speaker to produce such a danger of immediate harm should
be sufficient to justify government regulation? Why should a speaker’s
intention to create a present danger of immediate harm be considered a
substitute for creating the danger? Where is the speaker’s agency
regarding harm when her advocacy produces no risk? Holmes’s answer
in Abrams to these questions was, “Publishing those opinions for the
very purpose of obstructing [the war against Germany,] however, might
indicate a greater danger and at any rate would have the quality of an
attempt.”75 Recall that his idiosyncratic theory of criminal attempts
rested on the objective dangers they create rather than the
blameworthiness of the defendants.76
In his dissent six years later in Gitlow v. New York,77 Holmes
elaborated on how the concept of criminal attempt might bear on the
freedom of speech:
71 See HOWE, supra note 51, at 160–83; see also H.L.A. Hart, Diamonds and String:
Holmes on the Common Law, in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 278–85 (1983).
72 See Francis A. Allen, Criminal Law, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 257–58 (1964); Edward
J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the Clear and Present Danger Theory of the First
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1120–25 (1989).
73 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
75 Id.
76 See authorities cited supra note 72.
77 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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If the publication of this document had been laid as an attempt
to induce an uprising against government at once and not at
some indefinite time in the future it would have presented a
different question. The object would have been one with
which the law might deal, subject to the doubt whether there
was any danger that the publication could produce any result,
or in other words, whether it was not futile and too remote
from possible consequences.78
This is a justification for taking into account the speaker’s purposes, but
not to identify personal agency as a precondition for assigning legal
responsibility, rather as a variable that bears on the likelihood that harm
will occur forthwith. As always, Holmes was thinking about collective
consequences.79
G. Argument Seven: Permitting the government to regulate
political advocacy as a means of preventing remote harms
enables punishment for seditious libel.
Two of the four counts on which the defendants were convicted of
violating the Espionage Act of 1918 were for conspiring to publish
“disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of
Government of the United States” and conspiring to publish language
“intended to bring the form of Government of the United States into
contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute.”80 The majority in Abrams
declined to rule on the constitutional validity of those counts because it
found sufficient evidence in the record to support the convictions on the
other two counts: encouraging resistance to the war effort and
advocating curtailment of production of ordnance and ammunition.81
But Holmes perceived in light of the severity of the sentences meted out
to the defendants by the trial judge—twenty years imprisonment for
three of the defendants, fifteen years for the fourth82—that concerns
78

Id. at 673.
The most illuminating, brief account of Holmes’s consequentialism can be found
in Thomas C. Grey, Holmes on the Logic of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS
INFLUENCE 136–38 (S. Burton ed. 2000) (“In political philosophy, Holmes was a
preference utilitarian; he thought that people would naturally pursue their desires, and
that the best system of government was one that gave them the most of what they
wanted at the least cost. He was also a historicist, who believed that people were not
solely driven by a universal desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, nor even by a small
number of biologically given wants, but also by ideals and tastes that varied widely
according to culture and history.”). For a thoroughly researched and argued effort to
paint Holmes as a utilitarian, see POHLMAN, supra note 50.
80 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617.
81 Id. at 624.
82 See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
FREE SPEECH 145–46 (Cornell Univ. Press 1987).
79
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about disloyalty and bringing the form of government into disrepute
had infected consideration of all the counts in the indictment.
Holmes’s suspicion that the prosecutions were about sedition as
much as hampering recruitment and war production was possibly
triggered by a surprising decision made by the Justice Department
lawyers assigned to handle the appeal before the Supreme Court. They
chose to mount a full-throated defense of the view that Congress has
authority under the First Amendment to punish speakers for seditious
libel. They maintained that the infamous Sedition Act of 1798 actually
had been constitutional, notwithstanding the opinion to the contrary of
James Madison, principal author of the First Amendment.83 The
government lawyers’ daring attempt in Abrams to preserve seditious
libel as a regulatory tool was ignored by the Court majority, but it
certainly caught the attention of Holmes:
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that
the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel
in force. History seems to me against the notion. I had
conceived that the United States through many years had
shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying
fines that it imposed.84
The constitutional status of seditious libel was a question that
figured prominently in some of the arguments for free speech that were
pressed upon Holmes in the months leading up to his Abrams dissent.
In the Debs case itself, Gilbert Roe, a highly respected civil liberties
lawyer, submitted an amicus brief contending that the Espionage Act of
1917, the basis for Debs’ conviction, was a latter-day sedition act, clearly
unconstitutional for the reasons advanced by Madison.85 Harvard law
professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., wrote an article that Holmes read during
the summer of 1919 before meeting the author at Harold Laski’s behest.
In it Chafee proclaims, “The First Amendment was written by men . . .
who intended to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further
prosecutions for criticism of government, without incitement to lawbreaking, forever impossible in the United States of America.”86 And

83 For an account of the government’s argument, see id. at 232–33. Madison’s
constitutional critique is reproduced in James Madison, Report on the Virginia
Resolutions (1800), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 644–58 (J. N. Rakove ed., 1999).
84 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
85 Brief of Gilbert E. Roe as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff in Error, Debs v. United
States at 32–42, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (No. 714).
86 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947
(1919). For a detailed critique of this article and an account of how Chafee may have
influenced Holmes, see David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1283–1303, 1315–16 (1983); see also WHITE, supra
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Learned Hand’s opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, which Holmes
read either in 1918 or early 1919,87 twice asserts that a publication
cannot be denied access to the mails for creating a “seditious temper” or
a “seditious disposition.”88
All these arguments discrediting seditious libel might have given
Holmes a straightforward reason to dissent in Abrams had the
convictions been upheld by the majority on all four counts, including the
two counts that sound in sedition. But that was not the case. Justice
Clarke’s majority opinion studiously avoided relying on those two
counts, and the counts that were held to warrant affirmance were about
encouraging resistance and advocating curtailment of ammunition
production, the latter of which at least has no whiff of sedition about it.
What Holmes took from the severity of the sentences and the way
the case had been argued, however, was that permitting a conviction for
advocacy to be justified by a predicted impact in due course on the
production of weaponry would allow seditious libel to enter through the
back door. In effect, it would result in war critics being punished, as
Holmes put it, “for the creed they avow” rather than the harms they
might cause.89 That dynamic, unmistakably operating in the case at
hand, gave him a prophylactic rationale for restricting the kinds of harm
that can justify punishment.
H. Argument Eight: Permitting remote harms to justify punishing
expressions of opinion is inconsistent with highly valuing the
freedom of thought.
Holmes did not become a free speech legend for piercing the veil of
a few de facto sedition prosecutions. What has secured his place in First
note 55, at 427–30. For a fascinating narrative of how several progressives made efforts
during the summer of 1919 to get Holmes to rethink his views about the freedom of
speech, see THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT 1–5 (2013). For a discerning brief account
of these efforts see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Clear and Present Dangers of the Clear
and Present Danger Test: Schenck and Abrams Revisited, 72 SMU L. REV. 415, 422–27
(2019).
87 See Healy, supra note 65, at 806.
88 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, D.J.).
Among judges, Hand was ahead of his time in considering seditious libel to be
problematic. The Second Circuit noted in reversing Hand’s ruling that one of the
writings at issue is “not the voice of patriotism, and its language suggests disloyalty.”
Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 37 (2d. Cir. 1917); see also James Weinstein,
Learned Hand’s Masses Decision: Vindication and Influence, 50 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 927, 928
(2018).
89 Even before Abrams, Holmes had indicated that prosecutions which are ostensibly
about harm might violate the First Amendment if in reality they are targeted against
“speech as such.” See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); see also Fox
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915).
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Amendment history, prompting three different law reviews to publish
symposia marking the Abrams centennial,90 has been the power of these
words:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes can be safely carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment.91
Much has been written in search of the meaning and implications
of these immortal sentences.92 As always in matters Holmesian, Thomas
Grey is the surest guide. Assessing Holmes’s opinions in Abrams, Gitlow,
and Schwimmer, he concludes, “It was skepticism, not belief in the power
of free discussion to reach truth, or in the power of democratic
deliberation to make sound policy, that lent such memorable eloquence
and passion to these opinions.”93 As Grey well demonstrates, Holmes’s
skepticism was not a form of indifference, denial, or withdrawal but
rather engagement.94 How else to explain his voracious reading well
into old age and the vigorous ongoing exchanges he had with numerous

90 In addition to this symposium, see Symposium: Contemporary Free Speech: The
Marketplace of Ideas a Century Later, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1505–1774 (2019);
Symposium, 72 SMU L. REV. 361, 361–545 (2019).
91 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
92 My own few drops in the ocean that is this literature include Vincent Blasi, Holmes
and the Marketplace of Ideas, supra note 30; see also Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes
Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (1997).
93 Thomas C. Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O’Fallon Memorial Lecture on Law and
American Culture: Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 71 OR. L. REV. 521, 532 (1992);
see also Grey, supra note 79, at 133–57; Thomas C. Grey, Plotting the Path of the Law, 63
BROOK. L. REV. 19, 20 (1997); Grey, supra note 53, at 26–27; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 795, 804, 811–12 (1989). I am not alone in
judging Professor Grey to be the foremost authority on Holmes. See Richard Posner,
Foreword: Holmes, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 7, 9 (1997).
94 For a contrary view, see Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962); see also Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15
STAN. L. REV. 254 (1963). For Grey’s response, see Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O’Fallon
Memorial Lecture on Law and American Culture: Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy,
supra note 93, at 524–25. I explore Holmes’s skepticism in my Holmes and the
Marketplace of Ideas, supra note 30, at 13–23.
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regular correspondents young and old, liberal and conservative, even
radical?95 How else to explain how hard he worked at his job?96
The important point about Holmes’s engaged skepticism is that it
led him to believe that the freedom of speech is much more than a luxury
civil liberty97 to be extended in a charitable spirit when the cost is not
too high. Rather, as his Abrams dissent implies and his Schwimmer
dissent makes explicit, “if there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle
of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate.”98
Notice that here Holmes finds the value of speech to lie in the
thought that it communicates. In that regard, his Schwimmer opinion
echoes his Abrams dissent, where he maintains that the defendants’
speech should be protected so as to be tested by “the power of the
thought to get itself accepted” via “free trade in ideas.”99 Others might
treat speaking and writing as uniquely privileged activities partly for
reasons that have nothing to do with the ideas which are thereby
95 See, e.g., The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, supra note 54; THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN
LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN, 1903-1935 (J.B.
Peabody ed., 1964); HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 20; HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra
notes 20 and 23; Letters to Dr. Wu, in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS (H. Shriver ed., 1937).
96 See Charles E. Hughes, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 677, 678 (1931).
97 The term is Harry Kalven’s. See KALVEN, supra note 64, at xxii. We might think that
Holmes treated the freedom of speech as a luxury civil liberty in that he sometimes
characterized the speech he was protecting in denigrating terms. He called the speech
in Abrams “the surreptitious publishing of a silly pamphlet by an unknown man.”
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919). Gitlow’s manifesto he considered a
“redundant discourse.” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925). Those
descriptions might suggest that Holmes would not have protected the speakers had he
thought their ideas might be consequential.
We cannot know what he would have done if put to the test. Certainly he went out of his
way to say that even speech likely to cause real harm deserves protection when the harm
is not imminent. In Abrams, he posited a critic who during a war urges curtailment of
airplane production in favor of other military procurement. Such a critic must be free,
Holmes maintained, to “advocate curtailment with success . . . even if it turned out that
the curtailment hindered . . . the United States in the prosecution of the war.” Abrams,
250 U.S. at 627. What is required to justify criminal punishment, he specified, is an
“emergency” such that “an immediate check is required to save the country.” Id. at 630.
Of course, these professions are only dictum, but that is true also of Holmes’s
disparaging assessments regarding the impotence of the defendants’ advocacy in
Abrams and Gitlow. In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Schauer surmises
that Holmes had to have been aware that the speakers he wanted to protect in Abrams
ran in circles where the use of violence as a political tactic was frequently discussed and
sometimes practiced. See Frederick Schauer, Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Abrams Case,
and the Origins of the Harmless Speech Tradition, 51 SETON HALL L. REV. 205 (2020).
98 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929).
99 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
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generated. Such additional reasons—mainly concerning the intrinsic
satisfactions of autonomy, solidarity, and participation—played no part,
however, in Holmes’s interpretation of the First Amendment. His
approach was entirely instrumental and focused on individual thought
as it relates to collective understanding and will.100
An idealist might prioritize the principle of free thought for its
contribution to collective well-being via the harnessing of knowledge,
affirmation of human dignity, or facilitation of governance based on
popular sovereignty. Holmes, the skeptic, prioritized free thought
because he believed it helps people coexist amid intractable differences
and adapt to inevitable changes in their environment.101
It is noteworthy that in Abrams, he begins his riff about truth,
competition, power, and acceptance by invoking what people “may
come to believe” once they “realize[] that time has upset many fighting
faiths.”102 And what he posits they will come to believe is that our
knowledge is “imperfect,” that “all life is an experiment,” and that their
understanding of those limits “is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.”103 Holmes anticipated this line of
argument the year before in his amazing five-page law review article
Natural Law. There he says that “while one’s experience . . . makes
certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they came
to be . . . leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally
dogmatic about something else. And this again means skepticism.” 104
Perhaps his most powerful and succinct articulation of the point is in his
Lochner dissent, where he characterizes the Constitution as “made for
people of fundamentally differing views.”105
Holmes believed that by making salient and inescapable the
existence of persistent differences of opinion and ineffectual current
100

See supra text accompanying note 79.
For an excellent detailed summary of Holmes’s reasons for according high value
to the freedom of thought, see Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy
of Justice Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 661,
685–95, 706–09 (2011). Heyman faults Holmes for failing to be a liberal humanist. That
stern critique aside, Heyman’s descriptive account of Holmes’s thought is perceptive,
faithful, and well-supported—a major contribution to the literature on Holmes. In his
recent article Holmes, Humility, and How Not to Kill Each Other, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1631 (2019), John Inazu develops the coexistence rationale as central to Holmes’s
valuing of free speech. See also Grey, supra note 53, at 33 (“Marked as he was by his war
experience, Holmes was vividly aware of the community not as an organism but as a
field of battle—’its’ different portions want different things’ as he said.”). I emphasize
the adaptation rationale in my Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, supra note 30.
102 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
103 Id.
104 See Holmes, supra note 21, at 41.
105 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
101
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understandings, the freedom to express unpopular, even dangerous,
opinions can serve as a force against certitude, rigidity, and stasis. His
bottom line was that we have no choice but to learn to live with those
differences and with the chronic need to adjust or abandon some of our
cherished beliefs in order to survive. That his reasons for attaching
supreme importance to free thought are not particularly uplifting does
not undercut the claim that Holmes ascribed a great deal of positive
value to it.
The positive value that Holmes saw in the freedom to express one’s
heretical and/or harmful thoughts bears on the question of whether the
desire to prevent remote harms can serve as a justification for
regulating expressions of opinion. In the construction of First
Amendment doctrine, concepts like “harm” and “evil” need not take
their meaning exclusively from how the terms might be used in ordinary
language or specialized endeavors other than constitutional
interpretation. The concept of harm should not be conceived of as a
purely empirical phenomenon but rather as an element of the integrated
system of concerns, objectives, commitments, and prescriptions
embodied in the Constitution. Thus, harm needs to be defined with
reference to the values we ascribe to the activities subject to regulation
in the name of harm, along with other considerations such as how some
definitions of harm might facilitate abuse of the concept for unworthy
ends. Conceptions of harm that undermine the best reasons for having
freedom of thought and freedom of speech are a misfit.106
There is a word in Holmes’s precise formulation of his clear-andpresent-danger test in Abrams that deserves careful scrutiny. He says
that for expressions of opinion to be punishable, they must have the
requisite close causal connection to “certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”107 Interestingly,
Abrams was not the first case in which Holmes employed the adjective
“substantive” to classify harms. He did that in Schenck as well, where he
said that expressions of opinion can be punished only when there is “a
clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.”108 What did he mean by “substantive”?
What kind of evil would be non-substantive?

106 For an argument along these lines regarding what John Stuart Mill could and could
not count as harm in On Liberty, see Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress,
35 POLITICAL STUDIES 410 (1987).
107 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added). For an informed view of what Holmes
might have meant by “substantive” that differs from my understanding see Leslie
Kendrick, On Clear and Present Danger, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1653, 1664–66 (2019).
108 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added).
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“Substantive” could be taken to mean something like “significant in
degree, duration, effect, or prominence.” I submit, however, that by
coupling his references to “substantive” on both occasions with
references to what government has “a right to prevent,” Holmes was
maintaining that certain consequences we might commonly call harms
or evils are consequences that government has no authority to attempt
to forestall. Assuming that Holmes was thinking of the First Amendment
as the source of such a limitation, the “harms” that Congress cannot
consider to be harms in the constitutional sense most likely are such
things as beliefs, attitudes, assumptions, objectives, and loyalties, all of
which can be considered “non-substantive” in the sense that they are
“non-material.”
A non-substantive harm is not the same thing as a remote harm,
even as the two categories overlap to a great degree. In trying to
understand Holmes’s thinking about remote harms, his explicit refusal
to allow non-substantive harms to justify punishment for expressions of
opinion is pertinent because it provides an example of his giving
controlling significance to the positive value he ascribed to the freedom
of thought. Like remote harms, non-substantive harms are real. People
who experience those harms suffer. A society that experiences those
harms suffers. Nevertheless, in the case of non-substantive harms,
Holmes made the calculation that such suffering is insufficient to justify
sacrificing the positive value of the freedom of thought. So too, it seems,
with the case of remote harms, including remote substantive harms.
There is a striking asymmetry here to his balancing of societal harm
and benefit.
Nothing could be more evident about Holmes’s
understanding of the freedom of thought than that he perceived its
benefits to be realized, for the most part, over time. Like Milton before
him,109 Holmes took the long view when it came to identifying the value
of freedom of thought. Coexistence and adaptation are not matters of
immediate gratification. Yet when it came to identifying the harms that
can justify limiting the freedom to express opinions, he made imminence
the key consideration, thereby ruling out long-term consequences. That
may be asymmetrical, but it is not necessarily illogical. More
importantly for Holmes, it is not necessarily indefensible as a matter of
learning from experience. The fact that the future is inscrutable and
hostage to contingency may be more debilitating for predicting the
harms from free thought than for predicting the benefits. That was true
for Holmes precisely because he perceived the transcendent benefit of
109 I document Milton’s prioritization of the claims of posterity in Vincent Blasi, A
Reader’s Guide to Milton’s Areopagitica, The Foundational Essay of the First Amendment
Tradition, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 308–12.
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free thought to lie in its helping us learn to live with uncertainty and the
absence of control.
It is no accident that in Schwimmer, his valedictory statement about
the First Amendment, what Holmes says the constitutional commitment
protects at bottom is “the principle of free thought,”110 not the principle
of freedom “for every possible use of language.”111 In On Liberty, John
Stuart Mill made the same careful locution, reserving his strongest level
of protection for the “Liberty of Thought and Discussion.”112 Holmes
reread On Liberty in the spring of 1919.113 Years before, he had dined
with Mill in London, then attended a lecture with him.114 The two were
far from kindred spirits, however, because at the core of Mill’s
philosophy was his fear of majorities,115 while Holmes considered
majority understanding and will to be an important source of meaning,
as well as basic to creating the ever-evolving, inevitably temporary
order that enables individual survival and engagement.116
What Holmes and Mill had in common, despite their profound
differences,117 was the belief that for the freedom of thought to operate
as a force against stasis it needs to be accorded “absolute” (Mill’s
term)118 protection. To rule in particular cases that the benefits of free
thought are outweighed by the need to prevent remote harms would be
to compromise the elemental, society-defining role that the principle of
free thought played for Mill and Holmes. Each considered public
opinion to be important and all-too-often dominated by inertia, denial,
and resistance to change. A freedom to think that can be overridden by
inevitably subjective predictions of remote harm might advance
knowledge or adaptation in some ways under certain conditions, but the
110

United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929).
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
112 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 86 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale
Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
113 See HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 20, at 187 (letter of Feb. 28, 1919).
114 See STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 140
(W. W. Norton & Co. 2019).
115 See MILL, supra note 112, at 78–80.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34. See also Holmes, supra note 21, at 40.
On Holmes’s understanding of majoritarianism as a source of order see CATHARINE PIERCE
WELLS, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A WILLING SERVANT TO AN UNKNOWN GOD 166–73, 196–200
(2020).
117 For a comprehensive and probing comparison of the free speech arguments of
Mill and Holmes, see Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of
John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 35 (2010).
118 MILL, supra note 112, at 82. I explain how this absolutism is consistent with Mill’s
professed utilitarianism in Shouting “Fire!” in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39
CAP. U. L. REV. 535, 546–48 (2011).
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fragile quality of such a contingent mental freedom would be enervating,
making it no match for the forces of stasis. The freedom of thought
exists to engender, Mill and Holmes agreed, not just discrete discoveries
within predetermined bounds but a shared disposition in the populace
to hold all conventional understandings to account in the light of time
and experience. That Mill believed a sufficiently corrigible public
opinion can lead to progress while Holmes’s sights were less elevated
does not break their bond on this point.
It is noteworthy that throughout his lengthy chapter on the liberty
of thought and discussion, Mill never once discusses the harms that free
thought might engender, even as in subsequent chapters of On Liberty
he specifies how harm, carefully defined, can limit other liberties.119 In
Abrams, Holmes does not employ the term “absolute,” but the logic of
the imminence requirement, as he presents it, categorically rejects the
relevance of all remote harms. Moreover, he does say that whatever else
about the defendants’ speech and conduct might arguably be a basis for
regulation, “the creed they avow” is something “no one has a right even
to consider.”120 On the facts of the Schwimmer case, Holmes could have
laid waste to the majority’s empirical claim that remote harm to future
conscription might follow from allowing a fifty-one-year-old pacifist to
become a naturalized citizen. Instead, he rested his dissent on the
fundamentality of freedom of thought.
Holmes possibly was influenced in this respect by the example of
Learned Hand’s judgment in the Masses case that speech that is of
fundamental importance to the democratic process cannot be
prohibited even though it is likely to cause considerable harm.121
Holmes had no use for Hand’s theory that permitting “hostile criticism”
is essential to legitimating government authority122—Holmes did not
think in such terms—but he had other reasons sounding in coexistence
and adaptation to consider free thought to be fundamental. His opinion
in Abrams embraces that assumption by positing instances of speech
which simply cannot be made illegal, such as that of a patriot
questioning war production priorities or a visionary attempting to
“change the mind of the country.”123

119

See MILL, supra note 112, at 139, 142–43, 156, 160.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629–30 (1919).
121 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Holmes had
read Hand’s Masses opinion by the time he wrote his Abrams dissent, though exactly
when is not established. See Healy, supra note 65, at 806.
122 See Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 540.
123 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–28.
120
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In addition to emphasizing the fundamentality of free thought,
Holmes and Mill had in common the belief that speech which causes
harm immediately has little to do with freedom of thought. In fact, their
shared refusal to conflate the freedom of thought with the freedom of
speaking is what made their absolutism regarding free thought tenable.
In On Liberty, Mill says that telling an audience that corn dealers are
starvers of the poor should be protected when the message is conveyed
in the press but not when it is “delivered orally to an excited mob
assembled before the house of a corn-dealer.”124 Conceivably, he treated
the two cases differently on the ground that the harm potential is
greater in the mob situation. But is it really, given the exponentially
greater number of persons who receive the message when it is
disseminated via the press? More likely, Mill considered the two
situations distinguishable on the ground that in the excited mob
example neither the speaker nor the listeners are exercising their
“liberty of thought,” even as they might be exercising other
communicative or expressive liberties which in the scheme developed
in On Liberty deserve only qualified immunity from regulation. This is
how the preeminent Mill scholar John Skorupski understands the twin
corn dealer examples. He interprets Mill’s “liberty of thought and
discussion” to be based wholly on the value of “dialogue effects,” defined
as “those which occur through the autonomous response of a recipient
who engages with the expression critically, as an act of dialogue.”125
That is not what is happening in the excited mob example.
Mill judged liberty of thought to be a special freedom, which
generates unique, enduring, and radiating societal benefits—benefits he
had memorably cataloged in Chapter Two of On Liberty.126 He took the
unique benefits of the freedom of thought to be so fundamental as to
require “absolute” protection for the type of communication that
generates them, as he explained in Chapter One of On Liberty.127 In that
regard, he treated communication that embodies or facilitates the
liberty of thought differently from other types of communication.
Had Holmes addressed the two corn dealer examples, I believe he
would have come down just as Mill did, and with the same emphasis on
the presence or absence of free thought rather than the lower or higher
probability of harm. When Holmes said that “every idea is an

124
125
126
127

MILL, supra note 112, at 121.
See JOHN SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL 371, 374 (1989).
See MILL, supra note 112, at 118–20.
Id. at 82–83.
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incitement,”128 he did not imply that every incitement is an idea.129
Many incitements have nothing to do with thought or discussion. Mill
and Holmes had very different notions about why free thought is
valuable,130 but they were on the same page regarding what activities
are encompassed by the concept. It would never have occurred to Mill,
for example, to include falsely—or even truthfully—shouting “Fire!” in
a theater in his chapter on the liberty of thought and discussion. Like
Holmes, Mill would have considered such a warning to be an entirely
different kind of activity.131
Holmes also shared with Mill the view that certain conceptions of
harm cannot be employed because to do so would be inconsistent with
prioritizing the freedom of thought.132 Just as Mill could not count as
harm the genuine feelings of moral distress that observers can
experience when confronted with ideas they find abhorrent,133 Holmes
could not count remote harm as a reason to regulate the freedom of
thought despite the undeniable fact that immoral, unwise, and illmotivated ideas certainly can cause significant delayed or cumulative
harm. To allow remote harms to justify punishment for the public
expression of ideas, he concluded, would strip free thought of its
necessary vitality, something he considered more basic to human
survival and coexistence than whatever public safety gains might be
achieved by authorizing such punishment.
In his article Privilege, Malice, and Intent, published in the Harvard
Law Review in 1894, Holmes explained how under the common law, a
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See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
The majority opinion in Gitlow labeled the defendant’s verbose, formulaic call for
future revolutionary action a “direct incitement,” prompting Holmes to cry foul. Id.
at 665. Professor Chafee had the last word on whether Gitlow’s pamphlet had the
capacity to incite: “Any agitator who read these thirty-four pages to a mob would not
stir them to violence, except possibly against himself. This Manifesto would disperse
them faster than the Riot Act.” ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 319
(1941).
130 See Ten Cate, supra note 117.
131 See Richard Vernon, John Stuart Mill and Pornography: Beyond the Harm Principle,
106 ETHICS 621, 623 (1996) (Mill’s liberty of thought and discussion encompasses only
“propositions about actual or desirable states of affairs in the world, propositions
capable of being accumulated into larger bodies of knowledge.”).
132 For general discussions of Mill’s conception of harm in On Liberty, see David O.
Brink, Mill’s Liberal Principles and Freedom of Expression, in MILL’S ON LIBERTY: A CRITICAL
GUIDE 42 (C.L. Ten ed., 2008); D.G. Brown, Mill on Harm to Others’ Interests, 26 POL. STUD.
395, 396–97 (1978); JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENSE 57 (2d ed. 1996). For an
argument that Mill counts as harm only “perceptible damage,” perhaps the closest
equivalent to what Holmes called “substantive evil,” see JONATHAN RILEY, MILL ON LIBERTY
99 (1998).
133 See Waldron, supra note 106, at 413.
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privilege entitles an actor to cause harm with legal impunity even when
the harm is considerable. He maintained that such privileges inevitably
are grounded in the policy judgment that the benefit to society of
recognizing the privilege outweighs the conceded harm.134 Three years
later, in his famous article The Path of the Law, Holmes returned to the
subject of legal privilege to harm:
Why is a false and injurious statement privileged, if it is made
honestly in giving information about a servant? It is because
it has been thought more important that information should
be given freely, than that a man should be protected from what
under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.
Why is a man at liberty to set up a business which he knows
will ruin his neighbor? It is because the public good is
supposed to be subserved by free competition.135
Holmes conceived of the freedom of thought as a constitutional privilege
also deriving from a consequentialist calculation regarding the public
good.136
III. CONCLUSION
Holmes simply did not believe that the benefits to audiences,
present and future, that flow from the freedom of thought are
threatened by recognizing a power in government to punish advocacy
that “produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger
that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils.”137
Criminalizing expressions of opinion to prevent predicted remote harms
was for him a different matter altogether in terms of the potential
deleterious impact on the freedom of thought going forward. During the
course of the tumultuous year 1919, he came to believe that the only
safe way to prevent dissenters from being prosecuted “for the creed
they avow” is to disallow the consideration of remote harms. Ultimately,
the high instrumental value of freedom of thought, rather than the
unlikelihood, unimportance, or unprovability of remote harms, is what
determined the issue for him.
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See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–4
(1894).
135 Holmes, supra note 52, at 466.
136 On Holmes’s consequentialism, see Grey, supra note 79.
137 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919).

